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The Public Trust vs. The Public Interest
Arthur L. Littleworth*
INTRODUCTION
There is no lack of legal writing on the public trust doctrine. Law
reviews, treatises, and scholarly decisions chronicle the Roman and
English common law origins of the doctrine, and its evolution through
the courts of the United States.1 For the most part, however, the
public trust doctrine developed as a real property concept, affecting
only the private ownership of tidelands or other shoreline lands. Of
course, the doctrine traditionally also protected public rights of
navigation, commerce, and fishing in navigable waters, but did not
preclude the use of stream flows for water supply purposes. Indeed,
until National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,2 with possibly
one exception, 3 the public trust doctrine had no application to water
* Senior Partner, Best, Best & Krieger, Riverside, California. The author gratefully
acknowledges the exceptional assistance of Eric L. Garner, associate for Best, Best & Krieger.
Mr. Littleworth represents the State Water Contractors in the Bay-Delta hearings before the
State Water Resources Control Board, and the East Bay Municipal Utility District in the
current American River litigation.
1. See, e.g., Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 473, 475 n.15 (1970); Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's
Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, (1980) 14 U.C. DAvis L. R v.
195; Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environ-
mental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 63, 63 n.l. (1982); Hannig, The Public Trust
Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
211, 211 n.1. (1983) This latter commentator, however, maintains that this two thousand year
old doctrine ". . .is imbued with as much lore and confusion as were the sea dragons once
rumored to exist in the same waters." Id. at 212.
2. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal- 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346 (1983).
3. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457 (1976). This was not really a true water rights case. The case stands for the
proposition that the public trust doctrine requires a state to develop a planning capability so
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rights. For at least two important policy reasons, the large body of
property-based public trust law remains ill-suited to influence the
allocation of California's water resources.
In the first place, there is an inherent conflict between the operation
of California's vital water projects and the line of public trust cases
requiring that any governmental action affecting trust resources must
be consistent with the purposes of the trust.4 All of California's
major water supply systems take water out of rivers, and further
depend upon upstream dams that store high winter runoff and spring
snowmelt for later release and use. Now, since protected public trust
uses in California have been expanded to encompass recreational and
environmental values,s it is not possible for the state's large public
water supply projects6 to operate without impacting instream condi-
tions. Even if the total flow of water in any given stretch of river is
not diminished by such projects, the timing of flows is altered.
According to some environmental spokesmen, the reduction of spring
flows when reservoirs generally are filled can be especially detrimental
to fishery habitat. 7
The California Supreme Court in Audubon recognized the practical
impossibility of applying these tidelands precedents in a water rights
context. The court stated:
that water resources can be allocated in a manner consistent with the public interest. Thus,
this is really more of an administrative law decision which requires that public trust principles
be considered in the permit decision-making process. The present permit system in California
already considers such issues.
4. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892); People v. California
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596 (1913); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606
P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138,
151-52 (1884), Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24 (1912).
5. Marks v. Whitney (1971) 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790. In
that case the court stated:
In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification
favoring one mode of utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition
that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed
within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state,
so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and
as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and
which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.
Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 382, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (emphasis added).
6. These projects include the State Water Project which operates the large Oroville
Reservoir on the Feather River, a tributary of the Sacramento River; the Federal Central
Valley Project which has large storage reservoirs on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers;
the East Bay Municipal Utility District which obtains its water supply from Pardee and
Camanche Reservoirs on the Mokelumne River; the City of San Francisco which draws its
water supply from the Tuolumne River in Yosemite; and the City of Los Angeles which takes
water from the Owens River.
7. See, e.g., Hearing on Objections to the Draft Report of Referee Relating to Proposed
Diversion by East Bay Municipal Utility, American River via Folsom South Canal, Cal. Legis.,
1 Sess. 96 (1987) (testimony of John Turner) [hereinafter Hearing].
1202
1988 / Public Trust vs. Public Interest
The ... rule which evolved in tideland and lakeshore cases barring
conveyance of rights free of the trust except to serve trust purposes
cannot, however, apply without modification to flowing waters. The
prosperity and habitability of much of this state requires the diver-
sion of great quantities of water from its streams for purposes
unconnected to any navigation, commerce, fishing, recreation, or
ecological use relating to the source stream. The state must have
the power to grant nonvested usufructuary rights to appropriate
water even if diversions harm public trust uses."
California's present use of water already exceeds its developed sup-
plies. Moreover, the state's population is projected to increase by an
additional 10.2 million people by the year 2010.9 The state as we
know it could not exist if its major rivers were required to be
returned to their natural condition, to flow unused to the sea.
A second reason for discounting trust law precedent stems from
the basic purpose of the public trust doctrine. Historically, the
doctrine has served to protect public rights against exclusive private
ownership. But the water rights of California's major water supply
projects are themselves publicly owned and held for the benefit of
the public. Like the public trust doctrine, these projects are designed
to serve the public interest. The state Water Project is perhaps the
best example.10 This vast water system is owned and operated by the
State of California. It was authorized by the legislature in 1959, and
approved by a statewide vote in 1960. Project water rights are held
in the name of the state's Department of Water Resources. The
Project delivers water to thirty public agencies, serving water to 17
million Californians located in all regions of the state. Initial fi-
nancing included a $1.75 billion bond issue which is fully serviced
by payments from these thirty public agency contractors. Entitlements
under these contracts total 4.2 million acre feet annually. However,
the dependable yield of the Project is only 2.4 million acre feet
because certain Delta transfer and conservation facilities originally
planned have not yet been constructed. The Project-currently operates
under water rights granted in 1978 by the State Water Resources
Control Board after eleven months of hearings."
8. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 426, 658 P.2d 709, 712,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (emphasis added).
9. CAL. DEP'T. oF WATER RrsouRcEs BuLL. 160-87 at 6. The present shortage of reliable
water supplies is masked by the fact that 2 million acre feet annually of present water use is
being met from long-term groundwater overdraft. Id. at 2.
10. The project is well described in Goodman v. County of Riverside, 140 Cal. App. 3d
900, 190 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1983).
11. State water Resources Control Board [hereinafter S.W.R.C.B.], Decision 1485 (1978);
1203
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Yet in the name of the public trust doctrine, certain parties now
seek to decrease substantially the amount of water that is presently
available for diversion from the Delta by the State Water Project. 12
Although, earlier, in granting the State Water Project's water rights
permits, the State Board found that the allocation of water would
in the Board's judgment "best develop, conserve, and utilize in the
public interest the water sought to be appropriated."' 3 Of course, in
accord with current practice, the Board also reserved jurisdiction,
entirely apart from the public trust doctrine, to modify the terms
and conditions of the project permits for the protection of fish and
wildlife. The present hearings are being held in part pursuant to that
reservation of jurisdiction.
The niche reserved for this article is to examine more fully the
various efforts that are now being made to apply the public trust
doctrine as it has been integrated into water rights law by the
Audubon decision. The place to begin is with Audubon itself.
Tim AUDUBON CASE
The decision in Audubon was influenced by certain unique facts
which should limit any radical impact on water rights in general.
The Supreme Court allowed a direct appeal from the trial court
decision, bypassing the Court of Appeal. Clearly, the Supreme Court
believed that decisive action was immediately necessary to avert an
ecological tragedy. Though the case came to the court without an
evidentiary record, the court described Mono Lake as a "scenic and
ecological treasure of national significance, imperiled by continued
diversions of water."' 14 It noted that Los Angeles continued to exercise
United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 97, 227 Cal. Rptr.
161, 176 (1986).
12. The State Water Resources Control Board is now conducting hearings on a Water
Quality Control Plan for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary. These
proceedings are held pursuant to California Water Code section 13170, the Federal Clean
Water Act section 303(e), and United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). Later phases of the hearings may affect Decision 1485
and the water rights permits of the State Water Project and others. In these hearings, the
Environmental Defense Fund and a coalition of other environmental groups, including the
Sierra Club, have called for additional freshwater flows in the Delta of approximately 6 million
acre feet annually. This is approximately equal to the combined annual diversions of the State
Water Project and the Federal Central Valley Project from the Delta. Evidence in the hearings
showed that actual freshwater outflow in the Delta during recent times have averaged about
23 million acre feet annually. See State Water Contractors Exhibit 260A, at 26 (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
13. CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1985).
14. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
1204
1988 / Public Trust vs. Public Interest
its rights " . . . in apparent disregard for the resulting damage to
the scenery, ecology and human uses of Mono Lake."' 5
The petition for alternative and peremptory writs of mandate to
the Supreme Court contained a compelling explanation of alleged
unusual and pressing problems surrounding Mono Lake. Petitioners
argued that ". . . it is impossible to present this matter through the
normal appellate process in adequate time to insure that irreparable
harm will not occur to the Mono Basin environment."' 6 Petitioners
stated:
[That the events of last year, including a reduction by 85% to
95% in the brine shrimp hatch (upon which the millions of birds
that come to the lake depend) and the death of 95% of the
California Gull chicks hatched in the Mono Basin, indicate a
substantial threat of imminent irreversible environmental damage. 17
Petitioner's also argued the case from a national perspective:
Mono Lake is not only a major environmental resource of the State
of California. It is a national treasure. The threat to Mono Lake
has been the subject of increasing national interest. Attached hereto
... are copies of the cover story in Life Magazine on Mono Lake,
plus a copy of the recent National Geographic article on the impact
of the DWP diversions. on Mono Lake. 8
The threat to Mono Lake, as well as circumstances surrounding
the allocation of the water resource, were obviously unusual. Al-
though, at the heart of the Court's decision lay the fact that no
consideration at all had been given to Mono Lake when Los Angeles
received its water rights permits. Despite the fact that Los Angeles
had applied to divert "virtually the entire flow" of four of the five
streams flowing into the lake, despite protests that were filed, and
despite the acknowledged harm to public trust uses associated with
the lake, the administrative board acting upon the application thought
that it was required under the law as it then existed in 1940 to grant
approval.' 9 The Board stated at the time that it was "indeed unfor-
tunate" that the application would result in decreasing the aesthetic
advantages of the lake, but there was "nothing that this office can
15. Id. at 449, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
16. Petitioners' Petition for Alternative and Peremptory Writs of Mandate, National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983)
at xvi.
17. Id. at 2. These facts appear in the opinion and seem to have been accepted by the
court.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 424, 427, 658 P.2d at 711, 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 350.
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do to prevent it," and that it had no alternative but to dismiss the
protests.20 By 1979, the lake level had dropped by forty-three feet,
and its surface area had decreased from eighty-five to about sixty
square miles.2 1
The Los Angeles permits, however, stand in sharp contrast to all
appropriative water rights granted shortly thereafter. In the 1950s,
the statutes governing the appropriation of water were amended to
require specific consideration of environmental values. Those statutes
now require the Board to "consider the relative benefit" to be derived
from all beneficial uses of the water, including the preservation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. The use of
water for recreation and the preservation and enhancement of fish
and wildlife resources is specifically declared to be a beneficial use
of water.Y In determining the amount of water available for con-
sumptive use appropriations, the Board must take into account,
"whenever it is in the public interest," the amounts of water required
for recreation and the preservation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife resources.24
The Board must also take into account, "whenever it is in the
public interest," the amounts of water "needed to remain in the
source." ' 25 Further, the Board has broad discretion to condition
appropriations upon such terms and conditions as will "best develop,
conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be
appropriated." Thus, for more than the last twenty-five years the
State Board has been guided by the "public interest" in allocating
waters of the state, taking into account instream public trust values
as well as the water needs of cities and farms.
The two largest water projects in the state, namely the State Water
Project and the Federal Central Valley Project, both received their
water rights permits under these more recent appropriation statutes.
Moreover, the State Board in recent times has been reserving juris-
diction to modify water rights permits for the protection of fish and
wildlife purposes. Indeed, the present Bay-Delta hearings are in part
grounded upon this reservation of jurisdiction. 26
20. Id. at 428, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
21. Id. at 429, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
22. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1985).
23. Id. § 1243, (West 1985).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1243.5 (West 1985).
26. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 127-29,
227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 185-87 (1986).
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In Audubon, the Supreme Court wanted to force a reconsideration
of Los Angeles' rights, which under water law were "vested" and
thought to be virtually untouchable. The public trust doctrine became
the vehicle for accomplishing that end. The court said that the "core"
of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority as sovereign "to
exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable
waters of the state . . 27Yet, for all more recent appropriations
of water, this "continuous supervision and control" is built into the
administrative process for allocating water use. Moreover, independ-
ent of such reserved permit jurisdiction, and also independent of the
public trust doctrine, the courts have further indicated that the State
Board has authority to review the appropriative use of water under
Article 10, section 2 of the California Constitution, and Water Code
section 275.2
Nevertheless, Audubon states that these enactments do not make
the public trust doctrine "superfluous. ' 29 The court noted that the
non-codified public trust doctrine provides protection in the event of
any statutory repeal, and in cases filed directly in the courts without
prior proceedings before the State Board.3 0 The issue for the future
then becomes whether Audubon intended the public trust doctrine to
do more than merely subject Los Angeles' and other older permits
to current environmental review. Did the court in Audubon intend
to change the substantive balance between consumptive and instream
uses in the allocation of the state's waters?
BALANCiNG Crry, FAIm AND ENVIRONMENTAL NEEDS FOR WATER
Audubon requires that instream needs be "taken into account"
when allocating water for city and farm uses.3 1 That process of
balancing between the need to take water from rivers for consumptive
uses, and the need to leave it there, is now at issue in the Bay-Delta
hearings.32 The environmentalists, however, seek a good deal more
27. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
28. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 129-30, 227
Cal. Rptr. at 187-88. The plaintiffs in Audubon, however, specifically refused to rely on the
Constitutional provision and its statutory corollary found in California Water Code section
275. They based their case solely on the public trust doctrine. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 448,
658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
29. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 444, 446, 448, 452, 658 P.2d at 726, 728-29, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 364,
366, 369.
32. Ironically, in view of the urgency of the original appeal, the Audubon case has not
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than merely having public trust values weighed and considered in the
allocation of water. They are going after a preference for such uses.
One environmental coalition, 33 for example, argues that the Water
Board must "adopt a demonstrable bias in favor of resource protec-
tion." They contehd further that protection of trust resources must
be afforded "greater weight" than other aspects of the "public
interest;" that the Board must establish standards "which are sure
to protect public trust uses;" and that California law now requires
the Board to deny "environmentally destructive consumptive uses." 4
They seek "levels of abundance" in fishery, estuaries, and wetlands
resources that existed some forty years ago when California's pop-
ulation was under ten million, compared to about twenty-seven
million now. 35
Linked to this claim of priority is the corollary contention that
the burden of proof rests upon those that would take water from
the stream system. Water users, it is said, must justify any diversions
that would harm trust resources and, according to one party, are
entitled only to those flows available after public trust uses "are first
protected. "36
Despite the lack of evidence linking water diversions to actual
environmental harm, or reduced diversions to environmental benefits,
the environmental coalition concludes that the Board must establish
standards which are "sure" to protect trust uses, "even in the absence
of comprehensive data which ensures that such standards are neces-
sary.,"37
yet come to trial. More than five years, involving another appeal, have been consumed in
trying to determine whether the substantive issues will be determined in the state or federal
courts, or possibly referred to the State Water Resources Control Board. Meanwhile, parties
are attempting to apply Audubon in the Bay-Delta hearings. Phase I of these proceedings,
involving six months of evidentiary hearings, was completed in December 1987. The Board's
immediate aim is to adopt a Water Quality Control Plan. See supra note 12 and accompanying
text. There is some question whether the public trust doctrine properly applies at this point in
the proceedings. Nonetheless, the briefs at least forecast the arguments that will have to be
decided in the later water rights phase of the hearings.
33. This group of parties includes the Bay Institute of San Francisco, the National
Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Bay Area Audubon Society, the California Native Plant
Society, Citizens for a Better Environment, the Point Reyes Bird Observatory, and the Save
San Francisco Bay Association. The California Department of Fish and Game also argues that
fish and wildlife uses should have a "higher priority" than meeting export needs.
34. Closing Brief for Bay Institute of San Francisco, Phase I of the Bay/Delta Estuary
Hearing, at 6, 15, 81 (January 1988) [hereinafter Bay Institute] (emphasis added) (on file at
the Pacific Law Journal).
35. Id. at 78-79; DEP'T OF WATER Rsourcas BuuL. 160-87, at 7.
36. Brief for the Contra Costa Water Agency, Phase I of the Bay/Delta Estuary Hearing,
at 43. See also Closing Brief for the Environmental Defense Fund, Phase I of the Bay/Delta
Estuary Hearing, at 25, 32; Bay Institute, supra note 34, at 16.
37. Bay Institute, supra note 34, at 81. One well-known commentator, however, takes an
1208
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However, the notion of having fixed priorities in the balancing
process was rejected in Audubon itself. There Los Angeles attempted
to invoke Water Code section 106 which provides that "the use of
water for domestic purposes is the highest use of Water . .. " But
the court responded that this policy declaration had to be read in
conjunction with other later enactments requiing "consideration"
of instream uses. "Thus; neither domestic and municipal uses nor
in-stream uses can claim an absolute priority. '38
Also, the Racanelli decision39 implicitly rejects any priority for
instream uses in the water allocation process. The court stated that
the Water Board should establish beneficial use objectives that would
provide "reasonable protection," consistent With "overall statewide
interest," and considering "all competing demands for water." °
Nowhere in that lengthy opinion does the court suggest that consid-
eration of trust uses should receive any preference over consumptive
uses of water. Indeed, the court concluded simply that the Water
Board's decision in the Bay-Delta hearings was "essentially a policy
judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public interests...
1141
The primary thrust of Audubon was to bring the water rights of
Los Angeles under the same kind of environmental review as Cali-
fornia statutes require for more recent appropriations. The Audubon
court consistently used the same language of the current statutes,
namely, that public trust uses must be "considered" and "taken into
account." 42 The court's final answer to the question posed by the
federal court was that the public trust doctrine, as part of an
"integrated system of water law," imposed a "continuing duty on
the state to take such uses into account in allocating water re-
sources.' 43 That is all the court said. It did not intend to overturn
statutory law by granting a preference to trust values. The public
trust doctrine simply offered the means of reaching Los Angeles,
opposite view, namely, that a presumption should be recognized in favor of existing consumptive
uses. This approach would place the burden of proof on those challenging existing water
rights. Walston, supra, note 1, at 72.
38. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 447 n.30, 658 P.2d at 729, Cal. Rptr. at 365 (emphasis
added).
39. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 83, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 161 [hereinafter Racaneli] (commonly known by the name of Justice Racanelli who
authored the decision).
40. Id. at 116, 118, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 178, 179-80.
41. Id. at 130, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
42. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 426, 444, 446, 447, 448, 452, 658 P.2d at 712, 726, 728,
729, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349, 362, 364-66, 369.
43. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (emphasis added).
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and all older appropriators in similar circumstances, and of assuring
"continued supervision" over the exercise of water rights."
Environmentalists often cite Audubon as holding that the state has
a duty to "protect public trust uses whenever feasible.' "41 They
generally omit, however, the court's further statement found in the
same paragraph that the state as a matter of practical necessity "may
have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public
trust uses.'46 Neglected also is the statement that California's pop-
ulation and economy "depend upon the appropriation of vast quan-
tities of water for uses unrelated to instream trust values . . . " and
that the Water Board has the power to grant permits to take water
from a flowing stream for uses in distant parts of the state "even
though this taking does not promote, and may unavoidably harm,
the trust uses at the source stream.' '47
Those who would expand Audubon also single out the phrase that
no one can assert a "vested right to use [water] rights in a manner
harmful to the trust."'48 Read in context, however, this statement
relates only to the state's right of "continued supervision." It means
that water rights are not "vested" so as to prevent later state review.
It does not mean that public trust uses cannot be harmed. The
preservation of trust uses in the allocation of water extends only "so
far as consistent with the public interest." 49 The public interest is the
overriding standard that determines how the state's flowing waters
will be allocated.
When Los Angeles' rights are actually reconsidered at the trial
level, Audubon requires that the court or Water Board consider not
only the trust values associated with Mono Lake, but also Los
Angeles' need for water, its reliance upon the 1940 Board decision,
and the cost both in terms of money and the environmental impact
of obtaining water elsewhere.50 Therefore, at least these factors must
go into the balancing process. Evidence in the Bay-Delta hearings
44. Id. at 437, 447, 452, 658 P.2d at 721, 728, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358, 365, 369.
45. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
46. Id., 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
47. Id., 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
48. Id. at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
49. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
50. Los Angeles currently receives some water diverted from the Delta and supplied
through the State Water Project. The City's most likely alternate supply to Mono Basin water
would be this Delta Water. Of course, in the Bay-Delta hearings, environmentalists contend
that exports from the Delta must be substantially reduced from present levels in order to
protect public trust values.
1210
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also points to a number of other considerations that should be
weighed in balancing consumptive use and instream needs.
To begin with, the Water Board and the courts should look to
reasonable management approaches that will lessen the conflict be-
tween instream and consumptive needs. This is likely to be a require-
ment of reasonable use under the constitution, and is the only
practical option for meeting the needs of a growing population while
still providing reasonable environmental protection. For city and
agricultural uses, good management means conservation, reclamation,
and the use of any available alternative supplies. But the concept
also applies to instream demands. Public trust uses, like consumptive
uses, are subject to the reasonable use provisions of the California
Constitution.51 For instream uses, consideration must be given to
such non-flow measures as construction of facilities, habitat resto-
ration, fish screens, hatchery and stocking operations, and fishing
and hunting regulations. The Suisun Marsh Agreement52 represents
an excellent example of habitat protection accomplished through
construction of physical facilities, while saving large quantities of
water. Similarly, in the Bay-Delta hearings, most experts agreed that
conditions for striped bass could be significantly improved by certain
physical improvements within the Delta. 3
Other factors that should be considered in the balancing process
are: whether the trust protection being sought is consistent with the
overall "statewide interest," 54 or merely serves the pleasure of a few
at the expense of vitally needed water supplies; whether restoration
or enhancement of trust resources is at stake; whether flows are
needed to prevent the permanent loss of a species or ecosystem;
whether a species has the ability to accept periodic water shortages;
whether there is reasonable assurance that any given amount of flow
will, in fact, result in certain levels of fish and wildlife abundance;
whether any decline in fish and wildlife results from lack of flow or
from other causes; and whether flows are being sought to offset non-
flow caused impacts such as pollution or overfishing. Finally, the
51. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 443, 658 P.2d at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Audubon
recognizes the need "to make efficient use of California's limited water resources." Id. at
446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
52. This Agreement was entered into by the California Department of Fish and Game,
the California Department of Water Resources, and the United States Bureau of Reclamation,
and was approved by Congress in 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-546, Title II, 100 Stat. 3052 (1986).
53. See, e.g., Exhibit 64 of the California Department of Fish and Game, Exhibit 64
Phase I of the Bay/Delta Estuary Hearing (January 1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
54. Racanelli, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
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benefits of allocating water to fish and wildlife must be weighed
against the harm (social, economic, and job losses) of not having
sufficient water for domestic, industrial, and agricultural purposes.
Conversely, the benefits of water devoted to city and farm uses must
be considered against environmental harm.
DOES THE PUBLIC TRUST DocTmNE APPLY TO STORED WATER?
Claims have also been made to expand the public trust doctrine
to waters stored in upstream reservoirs. This issue is best illustrated
in the current American River litigation.55 Folsom Dam is located on
the American River, about twenty-three miles upstream from its
confluence with the Sacramento River. The dam and reservoir
(1,010,000 acre feet of storage capacity) were constructed in 1955 by
the United States and are operated by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation pursuant to permits issued by the State Water Resources
Control Board.5 6 Before construction of Folsom, as in the case of
most California rivers, flows were high in the winter and spring but
extremely low in the late summer and fall. The Bureau now operates
Folsom to provide minimum summer flows of 1500 cubic feet per
second (cfs), except in drought years. Under natural conditions,
August-October flows averaged only about 250 cfs.1 7 Reservoir op-
erations, on the other hand, have reduced spring flows from an
average peak of over 8000 cfs to between 5000 and 6000 cfs.5
In the course of the reference proceedings, the California Depart-
ment of Fish and Game laid claim to year-round flows downstream
of Folsom Dam that vould in essence appropriate the full yield of
the reservoir, without payment.5 9 Indeed, in many years such releases
would empty the reservoir, and the entire flow of the river would
not be sufficient to meet the demands. Moreover, Fish and Game
gave no consideration to the impact of their demands upon the
extensive fishing, boating and recreation activities provided by Folsom
55. Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. (Alameda Superior Court
No. 425 955) (referred to the State Water Resources Control Board pursuant to California
Water Code Section 2000). A five volume Staff Report was issued in February, 1987. Two
months of hearings were then conducted before a hearing panel of the Board itself. The Final
Report of the Board is expected to be issued by early summer of 1988.
56. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 893; S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1400.
57. See STAF REPoRT, ExEcuv SumiAY, Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District, at 8-9 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter STAFF
REPORT].
58. Id.
59. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 123-39 (testimony of Eric Gerstung).
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Reservoir itself. As the State Board Staff pointed out, there is a
"direct trade-off" between releases to enhance downstream river
flows and the "recreational uses made of the reservoir. ' 6"
The Legal Report prepared by the Staff in the American River
reference proceeding summarizes the arguments made by environ-
mental interests to apply the public trust doctrine to stored water. 61
They argued that the doctrine applies to a river's "entire annual flow
regime and not just to those months in which an appropriator reduces
flow below seasonal norms." 62 They contended: "There is no reason
to exempt stored water from the trust merely because it has been
captured and released at a different time of the year. The capture
and release of water does not mean the water should not be protected
for trust purposes. ' 63 They also argued that the natural flow regime
could no longer be used as a benchmark to determine the public's
rights in the river because it would be difficult to calculate and the
restoration of the natural regime was impossible. 64 Long maintained
artificial streams, they said, may come to be regarded as having the
attributes of natural streams. "Community reliance upon a long
maintained artificial condition will effect a dedication to the benefit
of the public that has through time become dependent upon the
condition.'"65
The Staff found that the issue was moot because the United States,
as owner of Folsom Dam and Reservoir, was not a party to the
case." The environmental arguments, said the Staff, "require the
presence of a project owner/operator of the water right and diversion
works in order to assure the release of stored water at rates exceeding
natural flow during some seasons." 67 The Staff did, however, ques-
tion the conceptual basis for the environmental position, asking:
"[H]ow can a common property interest occur in, or the public trust
attach to, a res (stored water) that did not exist in a state of nature? ' 68
The public trust doctrine is a limit on the power of the state, as a
fiduciary, to convey away certain assets in vhich the public has
60. STAr REPORT, supra note 57, at 4.
61. LEGAL REPORT, Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District
(American River reference proceeding), at 52-68 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
62. Id. at 59.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 60.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 52, 67.
67. Id. at 62-3.
68. Id. at 62.
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rights. It is not a grant of power over assets which the state never
owned.
There is little doubt however that the state, acting under its police
power and not under the public trust doctrine, can condition the
storage of water upon certain releases to protect downstream fishery
and environmental values. 69 The Board did this in Decision 1400 with
respect to a federal project, and in Decision 1485 with respect to the
State Water Project, both without objection to its basic power to so
regulate storage. Thus, if the trust doctrine requires only the same
kind of consideration of environmental values already built into
statutory water law, whether the public trust applies to stored water
is not an issue of major significance. 70 However, if the public trust
doctrine should finally be construed to give environmental uses a
preference over city and farm uses, then its potential application to
stored water would be a serious issue.
The landmark case of Marks v. Whitney7' is useful in analyzing
stored water issues. The Marks case involved an action to quiet title
in a boundary dispute in which the defendant was an owner of
tidelands. The plaintiff argued that defendant's asserted right to fill
and develop these tidelands would cut off his right as a member of
the public to the land and the navigable water that covered them.
The court in Marks noted that traditionally the public trust doctrine
had been applied to such rights as fishing, hunting, bathing, swim-
ming, boating and general recreational purposes in the navigable
waters of the state.7 2 However, the court expanded these traditional
purposes of the public trust doctrine to include "the preservation of
those lands [tidelands] in their natural state . . . . 3 The court stated
that the purpose of preserving tidelands in their "natural state" was
"[s]o that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as
open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area." 74
69. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1985) (the State Water Resources Control Board
has the power to condition appropriations upon such terms and conditions "as in its judgment
will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appropri-
ated").
70. It could still be of consequence to some older projects such as San Francisco's Hetch-
Hetchy project that operates without a State permit, or other permitted projects in which the
State Board did not retain jurisdiction.
71. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
72. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cap. Rptr. at 796.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
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A careful reading of the Marks decision makes it apparent that
the California Supreme Court was expanding the public trust doctrine
to preserve the natural state of a fragile and rapidly disappearing
ecosystem. It had no intention of encompassing artificial conditions.
By definition, artificial flows made possible by reservoir storage do
not have the natural values that the Marks court sought to protect,
and applying the public trust doctrine to them would not serve the
purposes enunciated by the court. The narrow scope of the Marks
expansion is apparent from the Supreme Court's opinion twelve years
later in Audubon.7 5 In using the Marks opinion to determine whether
the purposes of the public trust applied to the preservation of Mono
Lake, the court stated:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important
public uses of the tidelands a use encompassed within the tidelands-
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state ....
The principal values plaintiffs seek to protect ... are recreational
and ecological-the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity
of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds.
Under [Marks], it is clear that protection of these values is among
the purposes of the public trust.76
Audubon, like Marks, considered the public trust doctrine as a
protection for natural resources.
Nevertheless, in two other confusing and controversial opi-
nions, Lyons and Fogerty," the California Supreme Court seems to
have applied the public trust doctrine to artificial waters. In Fogerty,
where the court determined that the state retained a public trust
easement in the Lake Tahoe shorezone, even though a dam had
raised the lake level and inundated the natural shoreline, the doctrinal
underpinnings are too confused to serve as a general model for
extensions of the public trust. The court admitted there was no direct
authority in California on the issue of extension of title due to
artificial inundation, 7 but gave several arguments for the extension.
First, the court noted:
[The] monumental evidentiary problem which would be created by
measuring the boundary line between public and private ownership
75. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346.
76. Id. at 434-35, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
77. State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 696 (1981) [hereinafter Lyon], State of California v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 240,
625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981) [hereinafter Fogerty].
78. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d at 248, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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in accordance with the water level which existed prior to the
construction of [the hundreds of dams in California] provides a
convincing justification for accepting the current level of the lake
as the appropriate standard 79
Actually, it seems that a contrary holding would not have created
any significant evidentiary problems. Artificial shore zones would be
exclusively private, obviating any necessity of discovering the old,
natural boundaries now wholly submerged. The possibility of having
to pay compensation may have been the underlying factor in the
court's reasoning.80 If that were the case, the compensation issue
could have been dealt with in the same manner as it was in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, which is discussed below." In any event, the
court's rationale would seem limited to situations where originally
there were lakes that have now had their levels raised. Obviously
where there was formerly a river that has now been dammed, there
would be no former lake level to determine.
Secondly, the court noted that the dam had been in existence for
more than 100 years, "long past the period for the acquisition of
prescriptive rights by the state in land in question.' '82 This rationale
is also questionable because the State failed to meet the requirements
for prescription. A continuous use requirement was not satisfied since
prior to the court's decision the public had no right to go on the
private property. Nor was hostile use shown. Moreover, the impact
of establishing prescription without adverse use runs contrary to
public policy. Certainly, this holding discourages landowners from
allowing public use of their property. California Civil Code section
10009 was specifically enacted to provide a "safe harbor" for public
use of private property.
In Lyon, a landowner sought to reclaim a piece of marshland that
was located on the edge of a lake. The property was marshland and
was regularly inundated by the lake during certain times of the year.
The court held that this property was subject to the public trust since
the public trust extended to the high water mark of the lake. This
case is not really applicable to the present discussion since it applies
to the use of land, not to the ownership or control of water.
The Fogerty and Lyon cases are aberrant from the typical artificial
flow cases that arise under water law. A more likely precedent is
1216
79. Id.
80. Id. at 249, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
81. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See infra text at notes 87-89.
82. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d at 248, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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found in the case of Bohn v. Albertson.13 In Bohn, due to a levee
break, a landowner's property was flooded by the San Joaquin River.
This caused the land to be accessible by boat from the San Joaquin
River and thus it became a navigable waterway. The court ruled that
as long as the water was navigable, the public had the right to boat
or fish over the land. However, the landowners retained title to the
underlying land and had the right to reclaim the land and exclude
the public whenever they did so. Thus, the public only had a right
to use the overlying waters until the landowner reclaimed the land,
and could not require the water to be maintained for their use.
The holding in the Bohn case sets a healthy precedent for how
California courts should treat flows originating from reservoir re-
leases. Certainly those river flows are available for public trust uses,
but the reservoir owner should not be required, as part of the public
trust, to maintain flows that would not have existed except for the
reservoir. To do so would be to appropriate the reservoir without
compensation, and would perhaps be contrary to state legislative or
congressional authorization.
A very recent decision has also rejected a direct effort to control
reservoir levels through the public trust doctrine. 84 In this case, the
plaintiffs sought to prevent releases from Concow Reservoir that
would lower reservoir levels and thus impair use of the reservoir for
fishing and recreation. Of course, in the American River litigation
and in the Bay-Delta hearings, the converse claim is being made:
that stored water must be held and released later for the benefit of
downstream fisheries and recreation, despite adverse impacts upon
reservoir uses. In the Concow Reservoir case, the court found that
neither Concow Creek nor the reservoir were navigable, and therefore
the public trust doctrine had no application at all. It refused to
extend the doctrine to "all waters within the state, whether navigable
or not," and absent an impact on navigable waters. That was the
basis for the decision. But the court said there was still "another
reason" to deny relief under the public trust doctrine:
We are concerned here with an artificial man-made body of water.
It is a reservoir created by the defendants' authorized diversion of
water for specific purposes. As we have noted, the very essence of
the public trust doctrine is that the State of California acquired
83. 109 Cal. App. 2d 738.
84. Golden Feather Community Ass'n. v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 199 Cal. App. 3d
402, 244 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1988), reh'g granted April 6, 1988. (Concow Reservoir case).
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title as trustee to all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying
beneath them upon its admission to the union and cannot divest
itself of the trust obligation. The state has broad authority to
regulate the diversion of water from natural watercourses, but there
is no logical theory upon which we could hold that a public trust
attaches to artificial waterways or reservoirs created to utilize an
appropriative water right. In other words, the public trust doctrine
empowers the state to forbid or limit diversions of water in order
to protect the public trust in navigable waters. It does not, however,
give the state the power to insist upon the diversion and yet at the
same time empower it to preclude the usage of the appropriated
waters in order to protect a previously nonexistent public right in
artificial waterways.85
The court also rejected claims made under California Fish and
Game Code section 5943, noting that "the right of the public to fish
does not take precedence over public purposes which are incompatible
with fishing." Furthermore, various Fish and Game code sections86
"do not require dam owners to forego their own authorized uses of
impounded water in order to enhance the fishing opportunities of
the public."
The United States Supreme Court case of Kaiser Aetna v. United
States 7 also strongly indicates that the public trust doctrine should
not apply to artificial waters. This landmark decision grew out of a
dispute over a natural lagoon in Hawaii. In its natural state the
lagoon was not navigable. However, through dredging and filling
operations by a developer, the pond was enlarged and deepened and
a marina was constructed. These operations caused the marina to be
connected to the ocean, thus making the lagoon a navigable water-
way. The issue was then raised as to whether the public had acquired
a right of access to the marina. The Supreme Court held that the
public did not have an automatic right of access to the marina since
it has "... . never [been] held that the navigational servitude creates
a blanket exception to the Takings Clause ... 8. 8 The Court held
that although the government could assure the public the right of
free access to the marina under the commerce clause, this would
constitute a taking and compensation would be required. The Court
focused on the economic impact of governmental regulation and
85. Id. at 3263 (citations omitted).
86. CAL. -ISH & GAME CODE §§ 5931, 5933, 5938, 5942- (Vest 1984).
87. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
88. Id. at 172.
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interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. It char-
acterized the issue as whether petitioners' improvements so altered
the character of the lagoon that "it became subject to an overriding
federal navigational servitude, thus converting into a public aquatic
park that which petitioners had invested millions of dollars in im-
proving on the assumption that it was a privately owned pond ...
''89
Developers had improved the pond and built a navigable waterway
that had led to the creation of a 22,000 person community. It was
crucial to the existence of the development that the marina associated
with the community remain private. To allow the public free access
to the marina would have destroyed the purposes for which the
development was built. Likewise, the storage reservoirs of the State
Water Project and the federal Central Valley Project were authorized
and built primarily to store water for later urban and agricultural
use, to be paid for by such users. Flood control and incidental
recreational benefits were financed by the public at large.
THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF WATER PROJECTS
Another potential public trust issue concerns the legislative au-
thorization of certain water projects. When the Legislature has di-
rectly authorized a water project involving the construction of
reservoirs and the storage and diversion of water for consumptive
uses, what impact does that action have on application of the public
trust doctrine? The issue was first raised by one noted commentator 90
writing some three years before Audubon. Relying on People v.
California Fish Co.91 and City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,92
Professor Dunning noted that the legislature, in the exercise of its
discretion as trustee, has the power under certain circumstances to
dispose of property free of any public trust obligations. Under such
circumstances, the legislative determination is "conclusive upon the
courts." 93 Of course, the legislative intention must be clearly expressed
or necessarily implied, and will not be implied if any other inference
is reasonably possible. 94 Nonetheless, Professor Dunning indicated
89. Id. at 169.
90. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California's
Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980).
91. 166 Cal. 576, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr 327 (1913).
92. 26 Cal. 3d 515 (1980).
93. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 597 (1913).
94. Id. at 597.
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that the Central Valley Project might survive the scrutiny of Cali-
fornia Fish. He writes that, from the specificity with which the
legislature authorized the Central Valley Project, it is clear the
legislature intended to make a modification in public trust uses, and
that such a modification was justified by the overall beneficial impact
of the project on trust uses.95
Perhaps an even better example is the State Water Project. It was
conceived and approved with a specific yield of approximately 4
million acre feet annually in mind. This amount was arrived at after
extensive studies of the future water needs of the state. Project
facilities were designed and constructed to produce that yield, and
contracts were entered into to supply a maximum entitlement of 4.2
million acre feet annually. The size of the project, the various
facilities to be constructed, and its financing were all before the
legislature and the voters when the project was approved in 1959-
1960.96 However, specific water rights for the project were left to be
issued by the State Water Resources Control Board in the usual
course of its administration of water rights. In fact, construction of
the vast project was well under way before the first water rights
permits were issued.97
Under these circumstances, has the state made a disposition of
trust assets that exempts the water supply of the State Water Project
from any public trust obligations? There is no question about the
power of the legislature to sanction one public trust use at the
expense of another.98 That certainly can occur, for example, in the
case of a major dam that may enhance navigation and recreation,
but adversely impacts spawning habitat or the ability of fish to spawn
upstream. However, not all public uses served by a water project are
trust uses. In Audubon, the California Supreme Court specifically
rejected the contention that the state can abrogate the public trust
merely by authorizing a use inconsistent with the trust.99 Furthermore,
the contention that all public uses are "trust uses" so there are no
restrictions in the state's ability to allocate trust property was also
rejected.°00
95. Dunning, supra note 90, at 391.
96. Goodman v. County of Riverside, 140 Cal. App. 3d 900, 190 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1983).
97. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1275 (1967) and S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1291 (1967).
98. Colberg, Inc. v. California Dep't of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967) (cited with approval in Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 439 n.21, 658 P.2d at
722-23 n.21, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.21).
99. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 439 n.21, 658 P.2d at 722-23 n.21, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.
21.
100. Id. at 440, 658 P.2d at 723-24, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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The real issue is whether the intended yield of the State Water
Project, namely 4.2 million acre feet annually through even dry
periods, is subject to reduction to provide water for public trust
uses. 10' Plaintiffs in Audubon seemed to concede that water rights
"expressly conferred by the legislature would not be limited by the
public trust doctrine."' 1 2 If that is true, certainly it can be argued
that action by the Water Board should be nothing more, insofar as
the public trust is concerned, than the administrative procedure for
implementing the legislature's direction. On the other hand, the
various State Water Project contracts do not guarantee a yield equal
to their aggregate entitlements. Each contract provides for the pos-
sibility of shortage. And each contract provides only that the state
"shall make all reasonable efforts to perfect and protect water rights
necessary ... for the satisfaction of water supply commitments under
this Contract."'' 0 However, this does not necessarily mean that the
State Water Project should not be viewed as a direct expression of
legislative intent. California Fish states that legislative intent can be
clearly expressed or necessarily implied.'0 A strong argument can be
made that the approval of the State Water Project necessarily implies
that its basic water supply should not be limited by the public trust
doctrine. Audubon does not deal specifically with this issue.
IssuEs ON T= HORIZON
A number of other potential public trust issues have surfaced in
the American River litigation and in the Bay-Delta hearings, but have
yet to be seriously argued. They include: whether an impairment of
public trust values can be pursued against a single diverter or whether
all users affecting instream flows must be brought into the proceed-
ing; if a single diverter is vulnerable, how will its appropriate share
of the public trust obligation be determined; if all users must be
included, whether public trust flows will be taken from each, or only
from those with the most junior water rights; whether the doctrine
applies only to uses associated with water in the stream, or also to
environmental values located in a "riparian corridor;" whether the
doctrine protects the food chain alone (e.g., phytoplankton) without
101. The paradox is that the Water Board can to some extent control the yield of the
Project through its regulatory powers. The public trust doctrine, except for older projects,
may not give the Water Board as much authority as it already had by statute.
102. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 445 n.24, 658 P.2d 727 n.24, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.24.
103. Provision 16(b), Water Supply Contract with the California Department of Water
Resources (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
104. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 597 (1913).
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showing any linkage to fish, birds or other wildlife; how conflicts
among public trust uses are determined (e.g., high flows preferred
by rafters may destroy fish spawning habitat or be unsafe for
swimmers); whether new public trust uses created by project storage
(e.g., reservoir fishing and boating) can be offset against downstream
impacts; and whether the need to protect the quality of drinking
water supplies by diverting upstream can be balanced against envi-
ronmental impacts downstream. Of course, application of the public
trust doctrine can also invoke a "taking" that requires compensation,
but that issue is dealt with in detail elsewhere in this Journal. os
Whether any of these potential problems will cause serious concern
in the future administration of water rights law depends largely on
how the major issues discussed earlier are finally decided.
CONCLUSION
Reviewing the Audubon decision, Professor Dunning called it a
"healthy development in California water rights law."'16 But his
appraisal rested on the assumption that such added instream protec-
tion "can be provided without seriously damaging appropriative or
other private property rights in water."' 1 7 The Supreme Court itself
rejected extreme views on both sides of the Mono Lake controversy:
on the one hand that the rights of Los Angeles were completely
exempt from environmental review, even though public trust impacts
had never been considered; and on the other that the "public trust
is antecedent to and thus limits all appropriative water rights." 1 08
One view, said the court, would deny any duty to protect or even
consider the values promoted by the public trust; while the other
would "decry as a breach of trust, appropriations essential to the
economic development of this state."' 09 Instead, the court sought to
harmonize these opposing legal concepts, integrating both into a
system of water law that would be "more responsive to the diverse
needs and interests involved in the planning and allocation of water
resources." 110
105. See Schulz & Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights in Cali-
fornia Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031
(1988).
106. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law; Discord or Harmony?
RocKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 17-1 (1984).
107. Id.
108. Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 445, 452, 658 P.2d at 727, 532, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364, 369.
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The Audubon court's objective can indeed be achieved without
undue disruption or destruction of the required degree of certainty
in water rights,"' but only if the extreme views of the trust that are
being pursued in the Bay-Delta hearings and the American River
litigation are rejected. The public trust doctrine now assures, to the
extent not already required by the water rights law, that environ-
mental values will be fully considered on a continuing basis in the
allocation of the state's water supplies. The system can accommodate
that balance but not a priority for instream uses. If the public interest
of the state as a whole should be victimized by public trust over-
reaching, a reaction in the legislature or through the initiative process
is more than likely.
I 1l. The Supreme Court, as well as the Governor's Commission that reviewed water rights
law, have both recognized the need for certainty in the rights to use water. This need becomes
even more important as increased emphasis is placed on possible transfers of water rights. See
In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System 25 Cal. 3d 339, 355, 599 P.2d 656, 665-
66, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 359-60 (1979); FNA_ REPORT, GovERuoR's Com?&assIoN TO REvmw
CALIFoRNiA WATER RIGHTS LAW (Dec. 1978).
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